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A law school dean once asked me to suggest a restaurant for a

dinner meeting. I named a place, but told him that we could go
somewhere else if he objected to northern Italian cuisine. "In my
book," he replied, "anyone who objects to northern Italian should
start over." That struck me as surely right: Not liking northern Italian
food must be as good an indication as any that you have made too
many wrong turns and that you might as well put all your efforts down
as a failure.
Government regulators would do well to follow simple heuristics
like that. Writing good regulations - "good" in the sense of
promoting the public interest - always presents challenges.
Regulators must hit a small but important target where private
conduct is brought within appropriate government control, but
unnecessary compliance burdens and other deadweight costs are
minimized. Even if they see the government's objectives clearly,
regulators often have only a limited understanding of the underlying
private activities. Moreover, regulators may be unaware of how their
rules disrupt or distort those activities in socially harmful ways.

• Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to
Ethan Yale for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Regulators occasionally hit the target exactly. More often, they
miss - though not by an intolerably wide margin (good enough for
government work, as the saying goes). However, sometimes regulators
miss the mark so badly that the only responsible next step is to
acknowledge the failure. That is the case with the final regulations
1
under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 409A. Those
regulations are irreparably flawed - so flawed that the best members
of the practicing bar cannot make sense of them for basic transactions.
When the government issues rules that even experts cannot
understand, the government should start over.

I. A BAD BEGINNING
In fairness to the regulators who wrote the section 409A
regulations, the statute itself is fundamentally unsound. I had all too
close a look at the legislative problems when I was part of the
Treasury team that provided technical advice to the Congressional
staff who drafted section 409A. Although staffers added the worst
feature - the 20% penalty tax on "bad" deferred compensation after I left government, the wheels came off early in the process.
Without question, I share responsibility for the poor legislative
product.
Section 409A was originally intended to serve two objectives.
First, members of Congress wanted to eliminate "haircut"
distributions under corporate deferred compensation plans. Those
members objected to the constructive-receipt rule that allowed a
corporate manager to take a premature distribution of deferred
compensation as long as the manager forfeited part of the total
deferral. The mandate to Ways and Means staff was to draft
legislation that would ban haircuts. Second, Treasury wanted to bring
2
order to the general constructive-receipt rules. A quarter-century
moratorium on rulemaking in the area prevented Treasury from
narrowing the application of the constructive-receipt doctrine for
3
deferred compensation, and we saw the haircut legislation as a
vehicle for setting boundaries around what was permissible. For this
reason, we encouraged Congressional staff to include rules about
1

Application of Section 409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans,
72 Fed Reg.19234 (Apr.17, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.P.R. pt. 1).
2
See Enron Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong.
(2003) (statement of Pamela Olson, Assistant Sec'y, Tax Pol'y, Dep't of the
Treasury).
3
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
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deferral and distribution elections.
However, there are always those at the table with other
objectives. In this case, certain staffers wanted to add a strong punitive
element to the draft legislation. In their view, a corporate manager
who exercised too much control over when her compensation would
become taxable should be treated more harshly than a corporate
manager who had chosen not to defer her compensation in the first
instance. By contrast, Treasury argued that taxing "bad" deferred
compensation more heavily than current compensation was not
sensible tax policy. As a compromise, the draft legislation included an
interest charge on deferred compensation that failed the new rules.
The theory was that the interest charge would treat "bad" deferred
compensation the same as current compensation (allowing for a little
too much here and a little too little there).
4
As enacted in October of 2004, section 409A fell far short of
sound reform. Most importantly, section 409A failed to impose
accrual-based taxation on all corporate managers who earn
5
compensation in one year and receive it in a later year. Accrual-based
taxation, which follows directly from the Haig-Simons definition of
6
income, presents the correct result as a matter of tax policy. That
approach treats deferred compensation - regardless of whether it is
"good" or "bad" (in the sense of satisfying or not satisfying an
arbitrary set of statutory requirements) - just like current
compensation. In other words, accrual-based taxation eliminates the
7
possibility of a tax preference for deferred compensation. It may be

4

American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat.
1418 (2004).
5
The statute does impose accrual-based taxation on managers with "bad"
deferred compensation.
6
See Michael Doran, "Executive Compensation Reform and the Limits of Tax
Policy," (Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 18) (2004), available
at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311113. The discussion there relies heavily on the
analysis in Daniell. Halperin, "Interest in Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of Money,"
95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
7
Daniel Halperin and Ethan Yale argue cogently for a special tax on the
investment income of deferred compensation rather than accrual-based taxation of
the manager. Daniel Halperin & Ethan Yale, "Deferred Compensation Revisited," 114
TAX NOTES 939 (Mar. 5, 2007). If the special tax is to be collected from the
corporation, however, it may not reach situations in which the corporation is not
subject to U.S. tax. This would be a significant omission. The deferral of the
corporation's deduction under Code section 404(a)(5) would have no effect in such a
case, and the manager would continue to enjoy an unwarranted tax preference. If
instead the special tax is to be collected from the manager, it is not clear how it would
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that the Congressional staffers who sought penalty taxes for "bad"
deferred compensation would have preferred accrual-based taxation
8
in all cases, but that sensible starting point cannot justify the fallback
9
they ultimately pursued.
In their misguided eagerness to tax "bad" deferred compensation
more heavily than current compensation, the staffers responsible for
adding the 20% penalty tax ensured nonsense outcomes. Before
section 409A, the tax law set up a defensible hierarchy for deferred
compensation. Unfunded, unsecured deferred compensation would
result in tax deferral if the manager was not in constructive receipt of
the deferrals and current taxation if the manager was in constructive
10
receipt of the deferrals. Funded or secured deferred compensation
would result in current taxation of all vested deferrals, whether or not
11
those amounts were constructively received by the manager. The tax
results were harsher - current taxation of vested deferrals and
current taxation of investment earnings on those deferrals - if the
manager's deferred compensation was secured through a trust set up
12
as part of a discriminatory plan.
Today, a manager covered by an unfunded, unsecured deferred
compensation plan that fails section 409A is taxed more heavily than a
manager covered by a funded or secured deferred compensation plan,
13
even if that funded or secured plan is discriminatory. This stunning
result calls for emphasis: A manager whose deferred compensation is
protected fully from the corporation's creditors incurs a smaller tax
than a manager whose deferred compensation, although not

present any administrative or political advantage over accrual-based taxation. It is
presumably for this reason that new Code section 457 A, enacted as part of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, imposes accrual-based taxation on
deferred compensation for managers of offshore hedge funds.
8
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., WRITTEN
TESTIMONY OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND COMPANY-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF ENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES, at 20 (Joint Comrn. Print 2003) ("The Joint
Committee staff believes that [deferred] compensation should be includible in income
no later than the time it is earned unless there is a substantial risk of forfeiture of the
rights to the compensation.").
9
Halperin and Yale wryly observe that "[t]he rationale for the special penalty
under section 409A ... hasn't been completely developed." Halperin & Yale, supra
note 7, at 944.
10
I.R.C. § 451(a).
11
I.R.C. §§ 83(a), 402(b).
12
I.R.C. § 402(b)(4).
13
I.R.C. § 409A(a)(l).
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compliant with section 409A, remains exposed to the corporation's
creditors.
Consider the point from another angle. Congress applied section
409A to offshore rabbi trusts because such arrangements may protect
deferred compensation from a corporation's creditors. 14 However, it
did not apply section 409A to secular trusts even though such
arrangements in fact protect deferred compensation from a
corporation's creditors. Thus, the manager whose deferred
compensation potentially avoids the claims of creditors incurs a higher
tax than a manager whose deferred compensation actually avoids the
claims of creditors. These glaring policy mistakes cannot be justified.
Finally, section 409A substantially increases risk-bearing costs for
15
corporate shareholders. By taxing a manager with "bad" deferred
compensation more heavily than a manager who receives current
compensation, section 409A inevitably increases the costs to
shareholders of compensating the manager with deferred
compensation. Rent-seeking managers insist on indemnification and
gross-up agreements to cover the 20% penalty tax, and those
agreements shift the downside risk of section 409A from the manager
to the owners of the corporation. The phenomenon is no different
from what occurred in response to tax sanctions for golden parachutes
16
and compensation in excess of $1 million. Imposing a tax penalty on
corporate managers for reaching their hands too deeply into
shareholder pockets only encourages them to reach deeper still - so
that shareholders cover both the manager's greed and the statutory
penalty on that greed.
II. A TURN FOR THE WORSE
To tell the story of the Oxford English Dictionary, Simon
Winchester used the charming title The Meaning of Everything. In
writing rules under section 409A, the government appears to have
seen its job as the regulation of everything. Even by the standard of
tax regulations, the final section 409A regulations are very detailed
and very complicated. However, there is little cause for the
government to take pride in its effort. After defining an ambitious
scope for the project, the government failed to supply the judgment
14

H.R. REP. No. 108-548, at 342--43 (2006).
See Doran, supra note 6.
16
I.R.C. §§ 280G (disallowing a deduction for golden parachutes), 4999
(imposing an excise tax on golden parachutes), 162(m) (disallowing a deduction for
compensation in excess of $1 million).
15
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and craftsmanship needed to make such a complex system work. The
result is a tangled set of regulations that experienced, thoughtful,
compliance-minded practitioners cannot understand.
One important point should be made up front. The overriding
problem with these regulations is not that they are too tough on
taxpayers; indeed, on many issues, the regulators give more ground
than they should. Rather, the overriding problem is that the
regulations fail to provide effective guidance. The government tried to
address all conceivable issues that could arise under the statute with
detailed rules specifying outcomes to the last possible degree of
particularity. Then, recognizing that many of those outcomes would
be indefensible on policy or political grounds, the government made
up numerous ad hoc exceptions (with outcomes under the exceptions
also specified to the last possible degree of particularity). Although
the government intended to squeeze any possible ambiguity out of the
regulations, the approach had the opposite effect: Ambiguity is the
one reliable constant as the rules, exceptions, counter-rules, and
counter-exceptions pile up, trip over each other, and pull in different
directions.
Consider the deceptively simple question of whether an employee
has separated from service. Under the statute, an employee's
separation from service permits a distribution of her deferred
17
compensation. One might have thought that, given the great
diversity of the terms and conditions of employment, the government
would have seen the wisdom in using a flexible standard here rather
than trying to specify outcomes for every possible situation involving
every employee subject to section 409A. And, in fact, the regulations
give us a general statement that an employee has separated from
service if the employee has died, retired, or otherwise terminated
18
employment. That seems sensible enough, and many of us - after
adding an example or two indicating that sham separations do not
count - might have left the matter at that and moved on to the next
issue.
Instead, we are told that employment is not necessarily
terminated just because the employee is no longer working for the
employer. The regulations say that employment "is treated as
continuing" while the individual who had been an employee is on
19
military leave, sick leave, or other bona fide leave of absence. This
17

18
19

I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2)(A)(i).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-l(h)(l) (2007).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-l(h)(l)(i) (2007).
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treatment lasts for six months or, if longer, for so long as the
individual retains a statutory or contractual right of reemployment
with the employer. The regulators do not trust us to determine·
whether a leave of absence is bona fide, so they specify that a leave of
absence is bona fide only if there is a "reasonable expectation" that
20
the individual will return to work for the employer. We are not told,
however, who must have this expectation (the employer? the
individual? either? both?), nor are we told at what point one
determines whether the appropriate party does or does not have the
expectation (at the start of the leave? during the leave? at the end of
the leave?).
Next, the regulations tell us that, if the leave period exceeds six
months and the individual does not have a statutory or contractual
right to reemployment, employment is deemed to terminate on the
first day immediately following the end of the six months. This has the
trappings of a hard-and-fast rule, although the general proposition
about treating employment as lasting throughout a leave period
suggests that the employer and the individual may contract around it
by agreeing that the individual would have a right of reemployment.
The regulations make clear that the six-month default rule can be
extended to twenty-nine months, if the leave is because of a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to
result in death or to last for a continuous period of not less than six
months and if that medically determinable physical or mental
impairment causes the individual to be unable to perform the duties of
the individual's job or of a substantially similar job.
You might be glad that, if nothing else, at least you have slogged
through the separation-from-service issue. But, at this point, you in
fact have barely begun. All we have, so far, is a general rule defining
separation from service and a quirky set of rules about leaves of
absence. What about the myriad other ways that employment might
terminate? Now, you get the general rule about "termination of
employment," which is worth quoting in full, if only because it is
characteristic of the muddled prose that runs throughout the
regulations:
Whether a termination of employment has occurred is
determined based on whether the facts and circumstances
indicate that the employer and employee reasonably
anticipated that no further services would be performed after
a certain date or that the level of bona fide services the

20

/d.
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employee would perform after such date (whether as an
employee or as an independent contractor) would
permanently decrease to no more than 20 percent of the
average level of bona fide services performed (whether as an
employee or an independent contractor) over the
immediately preceding 36-month period (or the full period of
services to the employer if the employee has been providing
21
services to the employer less than 36 months).
Even that not-so-pithy sentence will not get you past the finish
line. There is still more work to do. First come the facts and
circumstances that feed into the determination. These include whether
the employee is treated as an employee for other purposes (such as
salary continuation and benefit plans), whether there has been
consistent treatment of others who are similarly situated, and whether
the employee is permitted and available to perform services for other
employers in the same line of business. The regulations are careful to
note that other (but unspecified) facts and circumstances may also
bear on the determination.
Next come the presumptions and the nonpresumptions, which,
incidentally, are not properly coordinated with the general facts-andcircumstances standard. These are built around the very dubious
notion that employers can make precise determinations about how
much any particular employee, no matter how high or low in an
organization, works from year to year. If the employee's services for
the employer drop to 20% or less of the average services performed
by the employee during the immediately preceding thirty-six months,
the employee is presumed to have separated from service. If the
employee's services for the employer remain at or above 50% of the
average services performed by the employee 9uring the immediately
preceding thirty-six months, the employee is presumed not to have
separated from service. Furthermore, if the employee's services for
the employer fall between the 20% mark and the 50% mark, there is
no presumption for or against separation from service. (I am not
making this up.) Whether anyone can actually implement these rules
- I believe that even the government will find them impossible to
apply on audit - appears not to have occurred to the regulators.
You are still not done with this issue, of course. The regulations
state that the 20% mark is not fixed; instead, an employer can treat
another level of "reasonably anticipated permanent reduction in the

21

Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-l(h)(l)(ii)(2007).
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level of bona fide services" as a separation from employment. If the
employer chooses this option, it must set out in writing a level of
services greater than 20% but less than 50% that will serve as the
23
threshold for presuming a separation from service. Apparently, the
no-presumption zone would then fall between the percentage chosen
by the employer and the 50% mark. Thus, assuming that an employer
could actually administer these percentage-based presumptions and
nonpresumptions, the employer could make limited adjustments to
the scheme.
No presumption is really a presumption unless it can be
overcome, so the regulations have rules for that as well. We are told
that the presumption against separation from service (that is, if the
employee's services are at or above the 50% mark) is rebuttable by
showing that the employer and the employee reasonably anticipated
that the employee's services would fall to 20% or less of the average
services during the immediately preceding thirty-six months (or full
period of employment, if the employee has not been employed for
thirty-six months). Similarly, the presumption in favor of termination
of employment (where the employee's services are at or below the
20% mark or any higher mark set by the employer) is rebuttable by
showing that the employer and the employee reasonably anticipated
that the employee's services would not fall to 20% or less of the
average services during the immediately preceding thirty-six months
(or full period of employment, if the employee has not been employed
for thirty-six months). Apparently, the nonpresumption that applies
when the employee's services fall between the 20% and the 50%
marks does not need a rebutting rule; in any event, none is given.
There are still more rules on this topic, including rules that tell
you how to treat paid and unpaid leaves of absence for purposes of
the presumption in favor of termination and the presumption against
termination. On top of that, there are rules for determining whether
independent contractors have separated from service, for determining
whether individuals who are both independent contractors and
employees have separated from service, for figuring out who the
employer is, for dealing with asset sales involving the employer, and
for handling collective bargaining situations in which employees work
for more than one employer. Of all the verbiage on separation from
service, my favorite passage is the requirement - buried about
halfway through these pages and pages of rules and stated without the

22
23

!d.
!d.
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slightest hint of self-consciousness - that a deferred compensation
24
plan must "specify" the definition of separation from service. How
could anyone even hope to do that?
In their current form, the regulations on separation from service
provide a numbing amount of detail but very little payoff in actual
guidance. Once one looks beyond the superficial determinacy, the
regulations actually give nothing more than a verbose facts-andcircumstances test. I cannot help but think that the regulators, if they
had thought about what their rules actually say, would have concluded
that they are unable to state categorically when an employee has
separated from service. The permutations of possibilities in how
employment is conducted and how it is terminated are too great to set
forth a single rule, and it is na'ive or arrogant to try. In the end, the
government might as well have given taxpayers the same advice that a
cranky federal judge gave as he sentenced an eighty-year-old
defendant to a thirty-year prison sentence. When the defendant
objected that he was an old man and could not serve thirty years, the
judge replied, "Do the best you can."
If the tortured-but-vacuous definition of "separation from
service" stood alone in these regulations, one could chuckle and move
on. However, there are two hundred pages of still more byzantine
rules. The result of all this hyper-specificity is, of course, exactly the
opposite of what the government intended. Rather than remove
ambiguities and uncertainties, the regulators have multiplied them;
rather than answer every question, they have raised many additional
and unnecessary issues; rather than translate legislative language into
a workable and administrable set of regulations, they have rendered a
provision with very serious consequences into an unworkable mess.
The best members of the practicing bar are at a loss to make sense
of these rules for many commonplace transactions. The regulations do
not give the coherent and sensible guidance that regulations must
provide. Rather than own up to the shortcoming, the government has
25
retreated into a "no-rule" position on the regulations. In effect, after
failing in its responsibility to provide usable guidance through the
rulemaking process, the government now refuses to address the many
questions, ambiguities, and outright inconsistencies that it has created
in any forum other than audit and litigation. With exquisite irony, the
regulators urge taxpayers to accommodate the convoluted regulations

24

ld.

25

Rev. Proc. 2008-61, 2008-421.R.B. 934.
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by avoiding "complicated" deferral arrangements. They have missed
the point altogether: The regulations do not give effective guidance
even for simple deferral arrangements.
The regulators should understand these problems by now. After
the final regulations were issued in April 2007, the practicing bar
responded twice that its clients simply could not comply with the rules
27
by the January 1, 2008 effective date. The government first
postponed the date by which amendments to deferred compensation
plans were required from December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008,
28
but held the effective date of the regulations at January 1, 2008. That
action, of course, was pointless. Difficulties in amending plan
documents are not nearly as serious as the difficulties in complying
with these problematic rules. The government finally relented and
29
postponed the effective date of the regulations until January 1, 2009.
In the meantime, the sensible standard of "reasonable, good faith"
30
compliance applies.
Ill. AFRESH START

Congress shows absolutely no inclination to undertake a
thoughtful revision of section 409A. At a minimum, that would
require repealing the 20% penalty tax, which ultimately amounts to
nothing more than a transfer of wealth from shareholders to the
government with substantial deadweight costs along the way. Still
better would be the outright repeal of cash-method tax accounting for
corporate managers so that tax is paid as compensation is earned and
vested. But those actions surely lie beyond the capacity of legislators.
The responsibility for a second-best solution, then, falls on the
regulators - the same regulators who so far have done just about all
they can to make a bad law worse.
By deferring the effective date of the final regulations, the

26

Sam Young, No More Guidance on Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Plan Compliance, Official Says, 2008 TNT 24-6 (Feb. 4, 2008).
27
See Letter from Ninety-Two Law Firms to Kevin Brown, Acting
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Aug. 21, 2007) (on file with author); see
also Letter from Ninety-Six Law Firms to Donald L. Korb, Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service, and Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec'y, Tax Pol'y, Dep't of the Treasury
(Sept. 21, 2007) (on file with author). At the time those letters were submitted, I was
(but no longer am) affiliated with one of the signatory firms.
28
I.R.S. Notice 2007-78,2007-41 I.R.B. 780.
29
I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 2007-46 I.R.B. 990.
30 /d.
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government gave both taxpayers and itself an important reprieve. The
government should use this time to consider very seriously its next
steps. It would be a mistake to push forward with the current
regulations; they are not a credit to the government and cannot be
salvaged in their current form. The responsible approach - the good
government approach - would be to acknowledge that the
regulations have been poorly conceived and poorly executed, to
withdraw them in their entirety, and to begin again.
There are many ways to improve the regulations in the next
round. I will suggest three. First, the government should limit the
scope of the regulations to the group of taxpayers of greatest (and
possibly exclusive) concern to Congress: corporate managers who
form "top hat" groups within their companies and corporate directors.
The statute on its face reaches more broadly, no doubt. But the
government can continue the reasonable, good-faith. standard for
union members, public school teachers, clergy, and everyone else
outside the target group while it writes regulations tailored to the
specific concerns presented by corporate managers and directors.
Among other benefits, that approach would spare the government the
awkwardness of penalizing elementary school teachers who want to
31
stretch their school-year salaries out over twelve months. More
importantly, it would simplify the range of situations that the
regulations would have to cover in the short run.
The regulators might protest that they lack the authority to limit
the reach of section 409A. That argument is transparently false. The
statute plainly provides that the government can prescribe regulations
32
"necessary or appropriate" to effect the purposes of section 409A.
All the government needs to do is determine that the necessary or
31

The Service magnanimously stated that, at least for the short term, it would
not sanction school teachers under section 409A for failing to make deferral elections
by the dates required under the final regulations. See Frequently Asked Questions:
Sec. 409A and Deferred Compensation, (Aug. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroornlarticle/ O,id=172883,00.html. The deferrals involved are
simply the pushing of income from one calendar year to the next when teachers
choose to receive their school-year pay over twelve months rather than nine or ten.
Left unexplained, of course, is why the Service did not exempt school teachers from
section 409A in the first instance. School teachers electing to take their salaries over
twelve months bear little resemblance to the corporate bandits who prompted the
enactment of section 409A. A small measure of common sense here would have saved
teachers needless confusion and the government needless embarrassment. But
common sense remains in short supply. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-62, 2008-29 I.R.B. 118
(describing expanded exemption from section 409A for teachers).
32
I.R.C. § 409A(e) (2006).
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appropriate rules for corporate managers and directors consist of
regulations but that, for the time being, the necessary or appropriate
rules for everyone else consist of the reasonable, good faith standard.
Such exercises of reasoned judgment by the government may be
infrequent, but they are not unprecedented: With considerably less
statutory authority than it has under section 409A, the government for
three decades took the position that it would not apply the qualified33
plan nondiscrimination rules to governmental employers. If the
government redirects its focus under section 409A to corporate
managers and directors, no one in Congress will complain that the
government has shirked its duty by not taking down everyone else in
the first round.
Second, in writing new regulations, the government should make
sensible use of broad and flexible standards. The over-reliance on
rules in the current regulations is misguided. It introduces unnecessary
complexity and sets up nearly endless ad hoc exceptions to
accommodate specific situations. The definition of separation from
service could have - and should have - been handled in one or two
sentences with a handful of examples. The regulators' baffling desire
to specify in advance the outcome for every conceivable case - which
does not succeed in any event - increases the level of indeterminacy.
Third, the government should simplify the regulations. The
statute is not sufficiently complex to justify four hundred pages of
regulations and preamble. Twenty-five or thirty double-spaced pages
should have been more than sufficient to write coherent,
administrable guidance. Rules of this length and intricacy do not
promote compliance; they undermine it. Certainly, the statutory
language of section 409A raises important interpretive points, and
without any doubt, the government must discharge its obligation to
interpret and enforce the law. However, that requires clarity of
guidance, and the approach taken in the current regulations has failed
to provide that clarity. The responsible next step for the government
is to start over.

33

See I.R.S. News Release, IR-1869 (Aug. 10, 1977). Congress ultimately
codified this result for state and local governmental employers in the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1977), and for all other governmental
employers in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780
(2006).

